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EFFECT OF SON'S MILITARY SERVICE
ON FATHER'S DUTY OF SUPPORT
One of the most perplexing facets of the law relating to support of
minor children is the question of how far into the future contracts
and decrees for support extend. More particularly, what is the effect
of a minor's marriage, entrance into the military service, or a similar
event on the father's duty to support the minor? Since the beginning
of World War II, the question of the effect of a child's entrance into
the military has been frequently presented to the courts.
The Supreme Court of Washington, in Koon v. Koon,' held that a
father was not relieved from making support payments while his son
was in the army. The son was assigned to duty in Seattle, where he
resided throughout his military life in a house rented by his mother.
The court reasoned that army service did not change the fact of de-
pendency since the mother had rented a house at additional expense
in order that the son could reside with her. In determining that the
father was not relieved of his duty to support, the court rejected
the contention that entry into military service had emancipated the
son.
So long as there is a basis for the father's obligation to support
the minor, then all lawful means should be used to enforce this ob-
ligation; but when conditions have changed, such as induction into
military service, then the court will modify the decree.2 The question
of whether circumstances have changed is ordinarily treated by the
courts as one of emancipation. 3
It is generally held that an enlistment by a minor is a contract
between him and his country which involves a change in his status as
a minor.4 This change severs the filial relation as completely as if the
15o Wash. 2d 577, 313 P.2d 369 (1957). This case also deals with the problem of
"the father's liability for accumulated monthly installments of support money for
minor children awarded by divorce decree to respondent wife for a period when the
children lived with and were wholly supported by him." Id. at 37o. This aspect of the
Koon case is beyond the scope of this comment.
2Green v. Green, 234 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. App. 1950). The primary duty of the
father to support his minor children is not lessened by a divorce decree, but when
the son becomes emancipated by induction into military service the father's primary
duty to support will be extinguished.
3Swenson v. Swenson, 241 Mo. App. 21, 227 S.W.2d 1o3 (1g5o); Wallace v. Cox,
136 Tenn. 69, 188 S.W. Gi (1916).
'Iroquois Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 294 Ill. io6, 128 N.E. 289 (192o); Baker
v. Baker, 41 Vt. 55 (1868); Gapen v. Gapen, 41 W. Va. 422, 23 S.E. 579 (1895).
Apparently no court as yet has held that consent of the parent to the enlistment of
the child is necessary to give the enlistment the effect of emancipation.
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child had become of age.5 The child is no longer dependent on his
father and ceases to be a part of his father's household while under the
control of the government.6 It cannot be presumed that the government
will not fully and adequately provide support, maintenance, and medi-
cal care for the minor.
7
What constitutes an emancipation is a matter of law, but whether
emancipation has occurred in a particular case is factual.8 A majority
of jurisdictions hold that an enlistment in the military, during its
continuance, constitutes an emancipation.9 If the military service is ter-
minated before his coming of age, the minor will again become subser-
vient to the authority of his parents;10 but if he attains majority while
in the military, the emancipation becomes absolute.' Since the ques-
tion of what constitutes an emancipation is a matter of law, and since
the occurrence of emancipation is a factual matter, a minor may be
emancipated for some purposes and not for others. For example, if a
minor left home with his father's consent, the father could not demand
his son's pay; but if the son became unable to support himself while
still a minor, the father might be legally obliged to support him.' 2
The Supreme Court of Washington has previously decided that a
support decree extends into the future only for the period during which
the children's dependency on their guardian continues. 13 That court
51 roquois Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 294 IIL. io6, 128 N.E. 289, 290 (1920).
"Streeter v. Streeter, 67 Cal. App. 2d 138, 153 P.2d 441 (1944); Schrader v.
Schrader, 148 Neb. 162, 26 N.W.2d 617 (1947); Stavis v. Stavis, 61 N.Y.S.2d 634
(Sup. Ct. 1946).7Corbridge v. Corbridge, 230 Ind. 2o0, io02 N.E.2d 764, 768 (1952).
6Wood v. Wood, i5 Conn. 280, 63 A.2d 586, 587 (1948); Crosby v. Crosby, 230
App. Div. 651, 246 N.Y. Supp. 384, 387 (1930); Fiedler v. Potter, 18o Tenn. 176,
172 S.W.2d 1007, 1009 (1943).
OUnited States v. Williams, 3o02 U.S. 46, 49 (1937); In re Morrissey, 137 U.S.
157, 159 (1890); Corbridge v. Corbridge, 230 Ind. 201, 102 N.E.2d 764, 767 (1952);
Green v. Green, 234 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Mo. App. 1950); Swenson v. Swenson, 241
Mo. App. 21, 227 S.W.2d 103, 105 (ig5o); Baker v. Baker, 41 Vt. 55 (1868). As shown
by the above cases, it has long been established that a minor is emancipated upon
entrance into the armed forces as far as the parents and the government are con-
cerned.
1ODean v. Oregon R.R. and Nay. Co., 44 Wash. 564, 87 Pac. 824, 825 (1906).
"Green v. Green, 234 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Mo. App. 1950); Swenson v. Swenson,
241 Mo. App. 21, 227 S.W.2d 103, iO (1g5o); Notes, 9 S.C.L.Q. 269, 276 (1957); 28
Minn. L. Rev. 275, 279 (1943).
2-See Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44 N.W. 295 (i8o), where a physician had
treated a minor daughter for typhoid fever. The daughter had been self-supporting
and away from home for three years. The court held that even though the father
knew nothing of the debt to the doctor until the demand for payment was made,
he was still obligated to pay the debt. The court reasoned that there was, at most,
a partial emancipation-i.e., an emancipation from the father's service for an in-
definite time. See also Note, 8 Md. L. Rev. 71 (1943).
1-Ditmar v. Ditmar, 48 Wash. 2d 373, 293 P.2d 759 (1956).
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has also determined that a mother cannot compel support payments
for children whose dependency upon her has ceased by reason of death,
marriage, attainment of majority, or service in the armed forces.
14
The principal case, however, indicates that entrance into military
service does not of itself alter the child's dependency on his mother.
The Koon case seems to carry the dependency theory quite far. The
issue should perhaps have centered upon whether the son's living with
his mother during his military service necessitated the continuation of
support,15 instead of whether the fact of dependency on the mother
negatived an emancipation by military service. The better reasoned
cases discontinue the award of support as unnecessary when the minor
enters military service, usually on the ground of emancipation.'0 The
Koon case, however, does involve a factual pattern not present in most
cases. Minors seldom reside with their parents while in the military.
Even if the Washington court relied on the theory of dependency, it
would seem that a minor is not his father's dependent during mili-
tary service. He is under the care and control of the government so long
as that service continues. 7
The court in the principal case cites two Georgia decisions,' 8 relied
on by the mother, as authority for the proposition that military ser-
vice does not terminate a support decree. The reasoning of these
Georgia cases, however, did not involve the question of emancipation.
In Torras v. McDonald, the Georgia court stated: "After the termi-
nation of a suit for permanent alimony and the rendition of a final de-
cree therein, not excepted to, the decree allowing alimony passes beyond
the discretionary control of the trial judge, and he has then no authori-
ty either to abrogate it or to modify its terms, unless the power to do so
is reserved in the decree."' 9 In neither Georgia decision referred to in
the Koon case had the court reserved the power to modify the decree.
It would appear, therefore, that permanent alimony in a Georgia
decree is a final provision for the child until he reaches majority. This
"'Id. at 76o.
uSee Neelands v. Neelands, io Mich. 537, 17 N.W.2d 743 (s945), holding that
an award for weekly support of a minor son who was in the navy was unnecessary
and could be discontinued.
'"United States v. Williams, 302 U.S. 46 (1937); In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157
(189o); Iroquois Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 294 Ill. io6, 128 N.E. 289 (1920);
Corbridge v. Corbridge, 230 Ind. 2oi, io2 N.E.2d 764 (1952); Argonaut Ins. Ex-
change v. Kates, 137 Cal. App. 2d 158, 289 P.2d 8oi, 8o5 (1955) (dictum).
'-Swenson v. Swenson, 241 Mo. App. 21, 227 S.W.2d 1O, io6 (s95o).
"8Peacock v. Peacock, 212 Ga. 401, 93 S.E.2d 575 (1956); Torras v. McDonald,
196 Ga. 347, 26 S.E.2d 598 (1943).
"26 S.E.2d at 599.
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conclusion is supported by the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Georgia.
20
The principal case reasons that it was not necessary to pass on the
question of emancipation since the army duty did not change the fact
of dependency. The two Georgia decisions must have had some bear-
ing on the outcome in Koon. Although citing them, the Supreme Court
of Washington fails to point out the fundamental difference between
the status of support decrees in the two states. Support decrees can
never be modified in Georgia unless the court expressly reserves the
right of modification; 21 in the State of Washington such decrees are
subject to modification. 22 Thus, the Georgia cases are not very per-
suasive on the question of whether or not the son's entrance into mili-
tary service relieves the father of his duty to support.
The decision in the principal case may have been based upon some-
thing in the nature of an "estoppel theory." Relying on the failure of
the father to modify the support decree, the mother rented the house
for the son's occupancy. If the support money cannot be recovered, the
mother will then have relied to her detriment on the father's continued
obligation of support. The father is thus "estopped" to deny liability. A
denial of recovery would be the same as retroactively modifying ac-
crued installments. 23
Actually, a mother in Washington has no personal interest in child
support money and holds it only as a trustee;24 hence, the mother
53Hardy v. Pennington, 187 Ga. 523, 1 S.E.2d 667 (1939); Henderson v. Hender-
son, 17o Ga. 457, 153 S.E. 182 (1930); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 151 Ga. 520, 107 S.E. 490
(1921); Woodall v. Woodall, 147 Ga. 676, 95 S.E. 233 (1918); Wilkins v. Wilkins,
146 Ga. 382, 91 S.E. 415 (1917); Coffee v. Coffee, iO Ga. 787, 28 S.E. 977 (1897). See
also Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933), where the Supreme Court in-
terpreted Georgia law. The court decided that "permanent alimony" in a Georgia
divorce decree is final and cannot be modified.
'Peacock v. Peacock, 212 Ga. 401, 93 S.E.2d 575 (1956).
21Wheeler v. Wheeler, 37 Wash. 2d 159, 222 P.2d 400 (195o); Anderson v. An-
derson, 27 Wash. 2d 122, 177 P.2d 83 ('947); St. Germain v. St. Germain, 22 Wash.
2d 744, 157 P.2d 981 (1945).
2'Most cases in Washington hold that while the superior court has authority to
modify a decree of divorce and reduce the amount of alimony as far as future
payments are concerned, it has no authority to modify the decree as to installments
which have accrued. Phillips v. Phillips, 165 Wash. 616, 6 P.2d 61 (1931); Boudwin
v. Boudwin, 159 Wash. 262, 292 Pac. 1017 (1930); Kinne v. Kinne, 137 Wash. 284,
242 Pac. 388 (1926); Beers v. Beers, 74 Wash. 458, 133 Pac. 605 (1913). Cf. Anderson
v. Anderson, 27 Wash. 2d 122, 177 P.2d 83 (1947); St. Germain v. St. Germain, 22
Wash. 2d 744, 157 P.2d 981 (1945), where the Washington court approved decrees
retroactively modifying payments which were due for support money by ordering
those payments then due cancelled and extinguished.
"'Wheeler v. Wheeler, 37 Wash. 2d 159, 222 P.2d 4oo (1950); Mosher v. Mosher,
25 Wash. 2d 778, 172 P.2d 259 (1946).
19581
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should not have relied on the support money to pay the rent. The
enforcement of support decrees is predicated upon the continued de-
pendency of the children.2 5 It follows that a mother cannot compel sup-
port payments for children whose economic sufficiency results from
their own earnings.2
6
The courts appear to reach different results depending upon
whether the obligation to support is created by a divorce decree27 or by
a separation agreement.2 8 Courts generally have power to modify di-
vorce decrees, 29 while separation agreements, which are not incor-
porated in divorce decrees, cannot be modified because of a change in
circumstances.5 0 Emancipation does not operate to release a parent
from an obligation to his child which he has expressly covenanted to
perform.
5 '
The intentions of parties should be clearly spelled out in divorce
decrees and separation agreements in order that such litigation as the
principal case may be eliminated. Unless the parties definitely want the
support to continue until the child reaches his majority, stipulations to
the effect that support shall terminate when the child is self-support-
ing or being supported by a third party should perhaps be included
in divorce decrees. Since most jurisdictions hold that the father is not
legally obligated to support his serviceman son, divorce decrees should
spell out clearly that support ceases when the son enters the military.
JOHN R. ALFORD
2Ditmar v. Ditmar, 48 Wash. 2d 373, 293 P.2d 759 (1956).
2"[A] mother cannot compel payments of support money for children whose
dependency upon her has ceased by reason of death, emancipation by marriage,
attainment of majority, service in the Armed Forces of the United States, adoption,
incarceration in penal or other custodial institutions, or economic sufficiency re-
sulting from earnings, gifts, or inheritance." Id. at 760.
z'Corbridge v. Corbridge, 230 Ind. 2o, 102 N.E.2d 764 (1952); Neelands v. Nee-
lands, Bio Mich. 537, 17 N.W.2d 743 (1945); Green v. Green, 234 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. App.
1950); Swenson v. Swenson, 241 Mo. App. 21, 227 S.W.2d 1o3 (195o).
"Carson v. Carson, 12o Ind. App. 1, 89 N.E.2d 555 (1950); Wack v. Wack, 74
N.YS.2d 435 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Eisenberg v. Eisenberg, 59 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1945);
Harwood v. Harwood, 182 Misc. 13o, 49 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1944). See
also Annot., 2o A.L.R.2d 1414 (1951), as to the father's duty under a divorce decree
or separation agreement to support his child as affect~l by the child's induction into
the military service.
'2 Vernier, American Family Laws § 95, at 194 (1932).
"0Carson v. Carson, 12o Ind. App. i, 89 N.E.2d 555 (1950); Harwood v. Harwood,
182 Misc. 130, 49 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1944).
-nHarwood v. Harwood, 182 Misc. 130, 49 N.Y.S.2d 727, 730 (Sup. Ct., App. T.
1944). Justice Hecht in his dissent says that the effect of the son's induction into
the army was to bring about a complete failure of the consideration for the separa-
tion agreement. Id. at 731.
